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Revisiting the Firm, Industry and Country Effects on Profitability under Recessionary and 
Expansion Periods: A Multi-level Analysis 
 
Abstract 
Despite voluminous past research, the relevance of firm, industry and country effects on 
profitability, particularly under adverse contexts, is still unclear. We reconcile institutional theory 
with the resource based view and industrial organization economics to investigate the affects of 
economic adversity, such as the 2008 global economic crisis. Using a 3-Level random coefficient 
model, we examine 15,008 firms across 10 emerging and 10 developed countries for the 2005-2011 
period. We find that firm effects become stronger under adversity whereas industry effects become 
weaker, as well as country main and interaction effects, particularly among the emerging economies. 
These findings confirm our assumptions that the firm’s own fate is, to a great extent, self-determined, 
a reality that is even more pronounced during periods of extreme economic hardship. 
 
Keywords: Firm effects, Financial Crisis, Markets and Institutions, Emerging Economies, 
Hierarchical Linear Modelling 
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Revisiting the Firm, Industry and Country Effects on Profitability under Recessionary and 
Expansion Periods: A Multi-level Analysis 
 
One of the most celebrated debates in strategic management research has been the relative 
importance of firm versus industry and country effects on firm profitability. After decades of research, 
we know that while industry–specific (Bain, 1951; Porter, 1980) and country–specific factors 
(Makino et al., 2004, Tong et al., 2008) are always present, firm–specific effects on profitability are 
more pronounced (Hawawini, Subramanian & Verdin, 2003, McGahan & Porter, 2002, Short et al., 
2007). However, despite considerable research in this area, we have yet to establish the relevance of 
firm, industry, and country effects on performance during varying economic conditions. In particular, 
we lack empirical studies of global recessions on the firm–industry–country effects on firm 
performance.  
In the present study, we bridge this gap in the literature by examining the relationship between 
firm, industry, country effects and firm profitability immediately before and after the 2008 global 
financial crisis. Recessions have been particularly and directly linked to poor firm performance 
(Greenwald & Stiglitz, 1988, Richardson, Kane & Lobingier, 1998). In addition, a plethora of 
evidence suggests that the 2008 crisis has had considerable direct and indirect influence on the formal 
institutions, even creating certain path dependencies for further institutional changes (Schwarzer, 
2012). Using neo–institutional economics as our main theoretical pillar, we posit that a global 
economic shock, such as the 2008 recession, can bring about seismic effects to the institutional 
environment and markedly alter both the formal and informal ‘rules of the game’ (Butter, 2012, 
Chakrabarti, Singh & Mahmood, 2007, Schwarzer, 2012) and, consequently, the role of the firm, 
industry and country effects on performance.  
The present study advances our knowledge in four distinct ways. First, the examination of the 
firm, industry and country effects during a period of economic munificence (2005–2007) and during a 
remarkable period of global economic recession (2008–2011) offers new insights on the power of 
economic cycles in shifting long established paradigms. Drawing from three well–established 
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theoretical pillars in the strategic management literature — resource–based view, industrial 
organisation economics, and institutional theory — we develop and test hypotheses on how the impact 
of the firm, industry and country effects on firm profitability is altered during these two contrasting 
periods. Second, in addition to examining main effects of firm, industry and country, we also 
investigate country–industry interaction effects, and further enhance our understanding of the joint 
effects of country and industry.  
Third, we conduct this investigation in a setting with ten leading developed economies and ten 
emerging economies, while accounting for industry variations. This setting offers unique insights for 
the overall impact of the global recession and allows for higher generalizability and validity of the 
study findings. Finally, in assessing the variance accounting for each effect (firm, industry, country 
and country–industry interaction) we employ a novel technique — multi–level random coefficient 
modelling (Short et al., 2007). 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First, the theoretical background and 
hypothesis development is explored. Next, the database and methodology are described, followed by 
the empirical results, and a series of robustness tests in several subsets of the sample (year, stage of 
development, per–country analysis). We then offer a discussion of key results and contributions to 
theory. Concluding remarks, discussion of special cases, and managerial and theoretical implications 
for future development are provided in the final section. 
	
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Economic rents generation has always been at the forefront of strategic management research. How 
firms achieve competitive advantage and thus superior performance remains an issue which has not 
been fully addressed. Varying perspectives provide their own points of view and justifications, some 
converging to a common rationalization, whereas others diverging miles apart, particularly when the 
role of an adverse context (such as a recessionary period) is blended into the discourse. 
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The resource based view and firm performance 
From a resource–based view, the consensus has always been that a firm’s ability to achieve 
competitive advantage and thus persistent above normal rents is dependable upon two pillars: 
(a) The firm’s ability to accumulate idiosyncratic, valuable and difficult–to–copy resources, 
providing the firm with a distinctive advantage against the general market competition 
(Barney, 1991, Conner, 1991, Wernerfelt, 1984) 
(b) The firm’s ability to blend the idiosyncratic, valuable and difficult–to–copy resources into 
unique firm–specific capabilities and competencies (Ketchen, Hult, and Slater, 2007; Prahalad 
& Hamel, 1990). 
In essence, firm heterogeneity originates from managerial decisions that delineate idiosyncratic, 
valuable and difficult–to–copy resources. These decisions are typically based on rational managerial 
choices, prompted by economic rationality, efficiency and effectiveness drivers, as well as by external 
influences (Oliver, 1997). Yet, competitive advantage can only be retained for as long as the 
uniqueness of these resources is sustained in the market. Thus long–term firm heterogeneity and 
sustainable rents have been attributed to a firm’s ability to uniquely blend the acquired resources into 
firm–specific capabilities and core competencies (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Conner, 1991). 
Associated with historical conditions, organizational culture and norms, a firm’s core competencies 
generate a causal ambiguity and social complexity within the organization. These competences are too 
difficult to be duplicated in a different setting and, as such, be exploited by competition (Wright, 
McMahan & McWilliams, 1994). 
While the resource–based view has been instrumental in deciphering the firm heterogeneity 
conundrum, it has largely overlooked the formal and informal institutional context and its influences 
on strategic choice (Oliver, 1997, Peng, Wang & Jiang, 2008). Within the premise of the resource–
based view the institutional environment has always been in the background, implicitly assumed to be 
relatively stable, unchanged and irrelevant to firm heterogeneity (Peng et al., 2008). If the institutional 
environment can be safely assumed to be constant, and thus ‘taken for granted’, then mainstream 
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theories, which ignore the relationship of the organization with its environment, can be applied 
without issues. Indeed as McMillan (2007) points out, under smooth market conditions in developed 
economies, the role of the institutions is almost invisible. However, the same cannot be argued for 
poorly performing institutions, where adjustments to mainstream management theories are often 
deemed necessary to account for the ‘context’ of the organization (Peng et al., 2008). Since the 
resource–based view cannot in itself predict firm behavior in shifting institutional paradigms, we turn 
to the domain of institutional economics, which offers a complementary viewpoint.   
Neo–institutionalism and firm performance 
Institutional theory concentrates on how firms operate within a certain social system. Every social 
system is built on a set of specific assumptions, rules and norms, binding its members to certain 
socially accepted and expected actions. Hence, institutions comprise all the formal (constitutions, 
legislation, treaties, court rulings, standards) and informal (shared norms, trust, customs and 
traditions, codes of conduct and social conventions) ‘rules of the game’, which structure economic, 
political and social interactions within a system (North, 1990). By reducing transaction and 
information costs, institutions aim at mitigating uncertainty, reducing information asymmetry, adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems, while developing structures and conditions which are 
encouraging for economic interactions (Hoskisson et al., 2000). In the meantime, and along with the 
regular constraints of economics (North, 1991), institutions tend to shape the strategic choices and 
decision–making processes of organizations. Hence, an institution–based view of strategy posits that 
strategic choices result from a three–way interaction of firm–specific resources, industry conditions, 
and the formal and informal constraints of the institutional environment (Peng, 2003, Peng et al., 
2008).  
Obviously, firm performance might be rather constrained by these rules, as well as the 
technological, informational and income limits of the context (Oliver, 1997). Yet, firms that conform 
to the social norms and the ‘acceptable firm conduct’ can easily gain the necessary legitimacy, and 
thus the resources and capabilities required for their survival and sustainable development. 
Homogeneity (isomorphism) is the key for sustainable growth and performance. In this respect, firm 
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behavior is not dependent upon rational and economically justifiable managerial decisions, but upon 
compliance, habitual and socially defined choices (Scott, 1987). The more acceptable a firm presents 
itself within its environment, the more successful it will be by gaining the necessary legitimacy from 
its peers.  
The impact of the 2008–2010 crisis on the institutional environment 
It is clear that the rise of new institutionalism and the development of the institution–based view of 
strategy place particular focus on institutional transitions, and the importance of the changing ‘rules of 
the game.’ The 2008 global financial crisis provides an excellent case for investigation of such a 
transition. Not only did it cause a systemic contagion, affecting most countries globally, but it also left 
firms, industries and countries vulnerable to a host of adverse events and risks. During the crisis of 
2008–10, as Butter (2012: 127) points out, the general environment of mutual trust (as in the U.S., 
prior to the housing crisis, and in the EU prior to the sovereign debt crisis) quickly transformed to one 
of mutual distrust, leading to severe credit deficits and illiquidity. The result was a sharp increase in 
transaction costs with a contemporaneous decline in firm resources (Latham & Braun, 2008, Pearce II 
& Michael, 1997). Such shortage of resources quickly lead to decline of productivity and 
competitiveness, job and wage cuts, reduced efficiency, lower profit margins, and in several cases, 
default (Richardson et al., 1998). The above evidence confirms that a global crisis, such as the 2008–
10 financial recession, seriously question the conventional assumptions of institutionalism. 
Furthermore, the 2008 crisis has had considerable direct and indirect influence on the formal 
institutions of several countries. For example, the U.S. responded to the crisis initially with the 
‘operation twist’ (purchase of short–term and the sale of long–term bonds), followed by a series of 
rather unconventional ‘quantitative easing’ programs. Similar responses were implemented by the UK 
and Japan. In the EU, the pressure of sovereign debt crisis brought about implicit as well as explicit 
institutional changes during 2009–11, primarily in the form of crisis management and ad hoc policy–
making. As Schwarzer (2012) points out, such crisis management decisions were not only examples 
of incremental institutional evolution, but also created path dependencies for further institutional 
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changes. Such interventions can be said to considerably alter the ‘rules of the game,’ and were 
received with criticism from within and outside of these economies.  
It is clear that, even in developed economies, a global economic shock, such as the 2008 
recession, can bring about seismic effects to the institutional environment and markedly change both 
the formal and informal rules of the game for market participants.  
Reconciling the resource–based view with institutional theory 
Although, social conformity is necessary for legitimacy and social approval, it can also lead to 
rigidity, impassiveness, resistance to change, and cognitive sunk costs (Oliver, 1997). These outcomes 
can be detrimental to the performance of firms, particularly under conditions of economic shocks. As 
Garcia–Sanchez, Mesquita and Vassolo (2014) proposed, economic shocks act as a natural cleansing 
mechanism of the markets from firms that are not well prepared to withstand changes in the 
competitive environment. Those firms that perform well during the shocks typically exhibit high 
productivity levels, technological dexterity, and enjoy high levels of learning as well as cost–
efficiency within their markets. Overall, severe environmental shocks generate strong economic and 
normative motives compelling even the more traditional firms to review their strategic choices, 
restructure their assets and re–align their resources to attain the dexterity and flexibility required for 
their survival (Oliver, 1997).  
In addition, in turbulent economic periods, where the ‘rules of the game’ are changing, strategic 
factor markets are also more likely to be imperfect. The shifting institutional environment and the 
increased uncertainty generate differing expectations about the true value of strategic factors (Barney, 
1986). As Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989) argued, financial crises, 
coupled with sharp stock market declines, increase adverse selection and moral hazard problems, 
jeopardizing firms’ market value. In the absence of safe collaterals, lenders become particularly 
unwilling to provide funds, whereas the heightened risks of a prolonged recession, political instability, 
and (one or more) major corporate failures make it impossible for the providers of capital to tackle the 
adverse selection problem. Under these conditions, resources may become unevenly distributed across 
competitors, leading to differing rent potential and heterogeneity, with firm–specific effects 
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accounting even more for performance variations. Indeed, Garcia–Sanchez et al. (2014) revealed that 
during severe economic shocks firm’s financial flexibility becomes particularly important for its 
performance. Such flexibility allows firms to cover their operational costs and also exploit growth 
opportunities when presented. 
Within the firm vs. industry effects debate, many studies incorporated ‘year effects,’ to 
control for the influence of potential systematic shifts in the economy. However, none of these studies 
made an explicit distinction between economic expansion and recession. There is no empirical work 
within the strategic management literature that offers reasonable expectations of the 2008 recession 
consequences on the firm effects – performance relationship. Taking the two theoretical approaches 
together (resource based view and institutional theory), we predict:  
Hypothesis 1:   Firm effects will be stronger in recessionary economic periods as compared to 
expansionary periods  
 
The industry based view and firm performance 
In contrast to the resource–based view, industrial organization economics or the so–called ‘industry–
based view’ of the firm, provides an alternative explanation. Resonating in Chamberlin’s work as 
outlined in the Theory of Monopolistic Competition (1948), and validated through the structure–
conduct–performance paradigm as introduced by Bain in the 1950s (Bain, 1951, 1954), the industry 
based view of the firm emphasized the importance of market structure in shaping firm profitability. In 
fact, a linear relationship is proposed between market structure and firm conduct, with a direct effect 
on overall firm performance. 
According to the industry–based view of the firm, firms are seen as integral parts of an 
industry. Industries with distinct market structures, and market conduct and performance tend to differ 
significantly (Bain, 1951: 29). The industry structure is obviously exogenous, influenced by internal 
competitive forces. These include: the number and size of competitors (market concentration), the 
competitive rivalry, the degree of product differentiation, the ease of entry and exit, market 
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information accessibility, and set–up costs of the already established firms (Bain, 1950, 1951, 1954). 
Any difference in profitability among firms in the same industry is a matter of the firms’ positioning 
against their counterparts within the industry (Porter, 1980, Schmalensee, 1985). 
The literature has focused largely on the association between industry structure features and 
performance (cf. Morgenson, Mithas, Keiningham, and Aksoy 2011). Such features as market 
concentration, barriers to entry, and firm size, as well as such non–structural elements as the industry 
growth rate have received particular attention (Bain, 1951, Gale, 1972, Mann, 1966, Shepherd, 1972). 
Despite the rich theoretical discourse, the empirical evidence directly linking industry–effects to firm 
profitability is rather inconclusive (Conner, 1991). Only since researchers have begun to employ 
analysis of variance frameworks, examination of the relative importance of industry–specific effects 
became possible (Schmalensee, 1985).  
Indeed, this new stream of research revealed that industry effects, although not predominantly, 
are important in shaping firm profitability, and account for as much as 23.5 percent of total variance 
in firm profitability (Short et al., 2009). Direct associations were further revealed between elements of 
market structure (i.e. industry maturity, entry barriers and competitive power) and performance 
(Powell, 1996), as well as between market structure and core strategic choices, such as R&D and 
advertising strategies (Mauri & Michaels, 1998)1. Furthermore, the importance of industry–effects 
was particularly heightened when smaller firms were included in the analysis. In such cases, industry 
effects were not only much higher (accounting for up to 54.2 percent of the total variance) but 
overpowered even the firm effects (Chang & Singh, 2000), corroborating the importance of firm size. 
Reconciling the industry–based view with institutional theory 
Similar to the resource–based view, the industry–based view has also received criticism for taking 
institutions for granted. Despite Bain’s (1951) emphasis on institutional linkages, there has been 
limited attention to the role of the environment, and how it may affect the industry structure – 
performance relationship.  																																								 																					
1   Mauri & Michaels, 1998 revealed that market structure had a direct impact on core strategic choices, such as 
R&D and advertising strategies, accounting for 55.4 percent and 68.2 percent respectively of the sample 
variance in either strategy. 
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A noteworthy exception is the literature on industry cycles and their impact on industry and 
firm performance. Industry growth cycles are characterized by rapid structural changes, a constant 
increase of the competitive field with new entrants, and severe demand fluctuations. High firm 
heterogeneity and high product variation is to be expected at this stage. Therefore, the importance of 
firm–effects on firm performance is inevitably stronger at the expense of industry–effects 
(Karniouchina et al., 2013). As an industry evolves towards maturity, the focus shifts towards more 
‘routinized practices’ that can facilitate efficiency improvements throughout the entire supply chain of 
the firm. At this stage, the competitive field is settled, the ineffective players are discarded, change is 
reduced, and industry output gets stabilized (Garcia–Sanchez et al., 2014, Karniouchina et al., 2013). 
In general, as Karniouchina et al., (2013) also showed, when moving from industry growth to 
maturity and decline, industry effects explain more variance in firm performance.  
However, the above findings cannot be generalized to recessionary periods, since industrial 
cycles differ fundamentally from economic ones. First, industrial cycles are ‘endogenous 
uncertainties,’ cyclical by nature, and to some extend predictable (Garcia–Sanchez et al., 2014). In 
contrast, economic recessions, being ‘exogenous uncertainties,’ are sudden and more violent in 
nature, with unpredictable, uncontrollable and less uniform periodicity and breadth (Mascarenhas & 
Aaker, 1989). In this case, it comes down to how well prepared a firm is to overcome the effects of 
such unpredictable events.  
Second, although some of the characteristics of an economy in recession resemble a declining 
industrial environment (e.g., reduced resources, limited capital availability, stale demand), these are 
exogenously imposed, and do not reflect endogenous industry problems. The decline stage of an 
industry, typically suggests its demise, instigated by such factors as technological obsolescence, 
sociological, and demographical changes (Harrigan, 1980a). However in a recession, the declining 
demand is simply a symptom of temporary contraction. Industry–effects are not to be blamed for the 
performance of the firms, but rather the strategic choices the latter make. Indeed, whereas divestment, 
retrenchment and exit are among the strategies proposed to offset declining industries (Chakrabarti et 
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al., 2007, Harrigan, 1980b), the most successful strategies for countering recessions are innovation, 
new product development, and customization (Garcia–Sanchez et al., 2014, Geroski & Gregg, 1997).  
Finally, whereas recessions might have a more prolonged impact on the economy and influence 
many industries simultaneously, not all industries will be in decline. In fact, during the 2008 
economic downturn, some industries remained almost impervious to the negative jolts of the economy 
(i.e. health care, pharmaceuticals, consumer staples), whereas – even more interestingly – some others 
emerged and grew mainly due to the economic situation (i.e. pawnbrokers) (Jiang, Koller & 
Williams., 2009).  
From the above discussion it is clear that we cannot generalize findings from the industry 
lifecycle literature to recessionary periods, because industrial cycles differ fundamentally from 
economic ones. In addition, as Garcia–Sanchez et al., (2014) posit, the effect of the economic cycle 
on industry lifecycle is conditional on the stage of the later. Therefore, and while Karniouchina et al., 
(2013) found that industry effects are stronger during an industry in decline, this finding can be 
conditional to the general economic conditions. We in fact posit a different direction of the 
relationship during an economic downturn. Strong economic shocks alter formal and informal 
institutions, and disrupt the status quo in industries, bringing about new structural dynamics, which 
affect both the internal competitive forces and demand. Such disruptive environmental conditions 
compel individual industry participants to deviate from uniform strategic responses, and employ 
diverging strategic choices, weakening the impact of industry–effects. Indeed, Majumdar and 
Bhattacharjee (2014) found that manufacturing firms exhibited weaker industry–effects during the 
Indian institutional transition towards liberalization. Their findings indicate that during uncertain 
times, when the ‘rules of the game’ are shifting, there is a greater need for firm–specific strategies in 
managing the complexity of the changing environment, rather than for conformity to the industry 
norms. Therefore, we expect that industry–effects will be weaker during an economic decline, and 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2:  Industry effects will be weaker in recessionary economic periods as compared to 
expansionary periods. 
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Country effects and firm performance in the emerging economy context 
Despite the general contention that country effects should diminish, due to globalization and 
harmonization of tastes, technologies, and institutions (e.g., Levitt, 1983, Yip and Hult, 2012), recent 
studies in international business, international economics, and finance increasingly provide contrary 
evidence. In fact, studies demonstrate that, despite the globalization phenomenon, integration among 
markets is not fully achieved due to exchange rate risks and tariffs, cultural barriers, and personal 
biases of the home country investors (Hawawini, Subramanian & Verdin, 2004). Indeed, country–
specific factors, such as the size of the country, the institutional framework, legal, government and 
political differences, and the utilization of the production factors and technology, can seriously affect 
firm strategy and consequently firm profitability (Makino et al., 2004, Tong et al., 2008).  
Country differences become even more magnified when contrasting countries at different stages 
of economic development, such as emerging vs. advanced economies (Peng, 2008). Emerging 
economies possess unique characteristics facilitating rapid growth and modernization (Cavusgil and 
Cavusgil, 2012). However, they also pose a wide range of risks and challenges for foreign companies. 
Specifically, emerging economies are characterized by market imperfections, such as asymmetric 
dissemination of production factors across all actors (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998); limited access to 
external finance or lack of financial intermediaries (Khanna & Palepu, 2000); and insufficient market 
supporting mechanisms and other policy distortions (e.g. high levels of corruption) (Khanna & 
Rivkin, 2001). These imperfections, combined with the existence of powerful family conglomerates2 
that dominate the trade within3, make these institutional environments rather unique (Tong et al., 
2008).  
The differences between emerging and developed economies are so profound that it can only 
result in unequal growth opportunities for firms (Peng, 2003, Tong et al., 2008; Majumdar & 
Bhattacharjee, 2014). Indeed, Diaz–Hermelo and Vassolo (2010) proposed that persistent superior 
economic performance is more difficult for firms in emerging economies. The highly unstable 																																								 																					
2  Some examples are: the chaebols in S. Korea, the business houses in India, the grupos in Latin America, the 
holding companies in Turkey.  
3  In Turkey, for example, the Koc Group accounts for about 20% of trading on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. 
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environment erodes the value of any successful strategy, preventing firms from retaining their 
competitive advantage for long. As the institutional context matures, however, the emphasis from 
institutional–based strategies shifts to resource–based strategies, reducing the impact of the country 
effects on firm performance. 
Empirical evidence provides strong support to the above premise. For example, Makino, et al. 
(2004) find that country effects in less developed economies account for higher variance in 
profitability (7.7 percent) than in the case of developed economies (3.6 percent). Similarly, McGahan 
and Victer (2010) demonstrate that in low income countries, country effects explain up to 4.6 percent 
of the total variance in profitability, but decrease to a mere 1.7 percent in countries with the highest 
income.  
Exploring the country effect in emerging economies during recession and expansion 
It is evident from the above that the case of emerging economies requires special examination. Since 
extant empirical research has clearly established that	the	country effects in emerging economies are 
significantly stronger than in developed economies, we test for the impact of recessions on the 
country–effect – performance relationship but in the context of emerging economies alone.  
 Interestingly, there are no prior contentions regarding the role of the economic environment on 
the country–effect – performance relationship. In the empirical literature, the effect of the general 
economic environment has been only measured as an interaction term, the country–year effect, which 
has been linked to the transient effects related to specific economic factors that are captured by the 
year effect in each country (Hawawini, et al., 2004). Yet, these effects are negligible – if not 
insignificant – leading us to believe that year effects or country–year effects do not really impact firm 
performance.  
A noteworthy exception is the work of Chakrabarti, et al. (2007) who examined the strategy–
firm performance relationship in emerging economies, and how it is influenced by an economy–wide 
shock. They note that in emerging economies, informal – ‘internal markets’ – are often shaped to 
cover for the weaknesses of the unsophisticated financial and institutional mechanisms in these 
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economies (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). The internal markets offer several benefits (i.e. easier access 
into privileged assets and know–how, internal transfer of financial and information resources, licenses 
etc.), which when properly exploited, enable firms to achieve higher profitability.  
However, during periods of economic contraction, the benefits bestowed by the ‘internal 
markets’ diminish significantly. The general reduction in capital accessibility and liquidity within the 
economy, the rising uncertainty, and the increasing transaction and information costs associated with 
wide–economic shocks not only impact on the external markets, but also on the efficacy of the 
internal ones. In such conditions, firms tend to revert back on their idiosyncratic competencies and 
strategies, rather than being reliant on informal markets and affiliations (Chakrabarti, et al., 2007). 
Indeed, Majumdar and Bhattacharjee (2014) showed that the contestable climate of institutions in 
transition inspire idiosyncratic capability development, and new firm strategic initiatives. 
Taking the above into consideration, we posit that country–specific factors in emerging 
economies have asymmetric effects on firm performance between expansion and recession. We 
specifically predict that: 
Hypothesis 3:  Country effects in Emerging Economies will be weaker during recessionary 
economic periods as compared to expansionary periods.  
Exploring the country–industry effects during recessions and expansions 
In an attempt to decipher the role of the country effects on firm performance, the country–industry 
interaction has also received considerable attention. Acknowledging that specific country advantages 
are directly associated with resources, attributes and/or expertise a country shares in certain industries 
(e.g. IT expertise in India, automobile industry expertise in Japan etc.) (Porter, 1980, Tong et al., 
2008), the country–industry interaction becomes meaningful. Makino, et al. (2004) suggest that 
industry is context–dependent. They argue that there are significant cross–country variations among 
similar industries due to differences in the factors of production (land, labor, and capital), and the 
level of their utilization (theory of comparative advantage). Not only prices vary among the same 
factors of production, but also relative production costs differ across countries. As Porter (1990) has 
-- 	 16	
long contended, countries do not only differ in terms of their resource endowments, but also provide 
unique competitive capabilities for indigenous firms. Heterogeneity among firms across countries can 
be attributed to how firms align and develop unique dynamic capabilities in their respective industries. 
The empirical evidence on the country–industry interaction effects is rather interesting. Most 
studies have showed that the interaction effects account for higher variance than the main effects of 
country and industry (Goldszmidt et al., 2011, McGahan & Victer, 2010, Tong et al., 2008). They 
also vary considerably among industries (e.g. from 11.7 percent in construction to 45 percent in 
transportation). In some cases, the joint effects of country and industry have been reported to 
cannibalize the main firm–effects (McGahan & Victer, 2010). Yet the question still remains as to how 
country–industry effects behave in varying economic conditions — specifically during recessionary 
and expansionary periods. Having hypothesized that both industry and country specific effects will 
diminish during recessionary periods, we expect that the joint country–industry effects will be further 
weakened during recession.  
During periods of economic stability, it is likely that certain industries within a country may be 
seen as instrumental or of high priority by respective governments. Hence, the institutional context 
will be particularly munificent and encouraging, supportive of these country–specific industries, and 
intensifying the country–industry effects. However, in times of economic shocks, such as recessions, 
it is natural that the level of institutional support even for these country–specific industries may be 
reduced in light of increased uncertainty, illiquidity, and capital deficits. In addition, the general 
adverse conditions and shifts in demand during a recession may constrain the industry advantages 
across specific countries. For example, once the global demand for automobiles drops, the advantages 
of the auto–industry in Japan will be diluted. Generally, such a shift will further increase the 
competitive conditions, forcing firms to adopt resource–based strategies to achieve heterogeneity, and 
reduce country–industry effects on firm performance. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 4: The country–industry effects will be weaker during recessionary economic 
periods as compared to expansionary periods. 	
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DATA AND METHODS 
Dataset 
The dataset for this study is derived from Thomson ONE Banker, which includes over 60,000 active 
publicly listed companies during the period under examination (2005–2011). We retrieved data for all 
companies listed in the main exchanges for 10 emerging and 10 developed countries4. The emerging 
countries in our sample include Brazil (BRA), China (CHN), Indonesia (IDN), India (IND), South 
Korea (KOR), Mexico (MEX), Philippines (PHL), Poland (POL), Turkey (TUR) and South Africa 
(ZAF). The developed countries sampled include Australia (AUS), Canada (CAN), Switzerland 
(CHE) Germany (DEU), United Kingdom (GBR), Japan (JPN), Netherlands (NDL), Norway (NOR) 
Sweden (SWE) and the United States (USA).  
The final dataset (see Table A1–1 in Appendix 1), comprises data on 15,008 firms, for the 
period 2005–2011, resulting in 105,056 firm–year observations. The firms in our sample are from 779 
SIC4 and 60 SIC2 industries, and fall under the following eight main industry sectors: SIC2 10–14: 
Mining, SIC2 15–17: Construction, SIC2 20–39: Manufacturing, SIC2 40–49: Transportation & 
Public Utilities, SIC2 50–51:Wholesale Trade, SIC2 52–59: Retail Trade, SIC2 60–67: Finance, 
Insurance, Real Estate and SIC2 70–89: Services.  
Model estimation 
The multilevel framework of firm, industry and country effects is tested using hierarchical linear 
multilevel (HLM) modelling (Raudenbush et al., 2004, Stewart et al., 1998). HLM and structural 
variance decomposition studies have been used in a variety of strategic management studies (Bou and 
Satorra 2007, 2010; Short et al., 2007). The technique is particularly appropriate for this study 
																																								 																					
4  For the selection of the ten developed countries we used the Human Development Index (HDI) 2011, a 
statistical measure that represents the level of development of a country in both economic and social terms 
(http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/). According to the HDI, among the ten most developed countries, 
Ireland and Liechtenstein are also included; however due to the financial problems the former is facing and 
the very small size of the latter, we excluded these two cases and added instead the next two countries in 
line, Switzerland and Japan. For the emerging countries, our primary goal was to select those with the 
strongest capital markets so as to be able to draw reliable financial information (ROA). Hence we used the 
Dow Jones Index (DJI), which classifies the markets with respect to three criteria: a) market and regulatory 
structure, b) trading environment, and c) operational efficiency. 21 countries are defined by DJI as emerging 
in four regions (America, Asia/Pacific, Europe, Africa). We selected a sample of all regions.	
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because of the hierarchical nature of the data (i.e., firms nested in industries, industries nested in 
countries). It provides for simultaneous partitioning of the variance–covariance components, while 
“explicitly accounting for the independence of errors assumptions that may be violated when using 
other techniques such as OLS regression” (Short et al., 2009). In addition, HLM is more flexible with 
data since it does not require balanced dataset to generate results, allowing for estimates of both 
random and fixed effects. 
We use a three–level model to test the effects of firms (level–1) nested within the effects of 
industries (level–2) nested within the effects of countries (level–3) among developed and emerging as 
well as in the overall sample for three different time periods. Most past studies in the debate have 
measured firm performance in terms of economic attainment using principally Return–on–Asset 
(ROA) ratios. For comparability purposes we also employ the ROA, averaged for each examined 
period. Thus for the overall model, Mean–ROA for the entire period (2005–2011) is used, whereas for 
the expansion period we use Mean–ROA for the years 2005–2007, and for the recession we use 
Mean–ROA for the years 2008–2011.  
The level–1 model corresponds to the performance of each firm as a function of an industry 
mean and random error. Thus:  
Performanceijk = π0j + eij,  (1) 
where Performanceijk is the average ROA of firm i in industry j in country k. The coefficient π0j 
is the level–1 (firm) intercept, and eij is a random firm effect (the deviation of firm ij’s score from the 
industry mean). The effects are assumed to be normally distributed with a zero mean and variance s2. 
The subscripts i, j and k designate firms, industries and countries with i = 1,2,…, ni firms within 
industry j; j = 1,2,…, nj industries, within countries k; k = 1,2,…, nk countries. 
The level–2 (industry) model corresponds to the variability among industries with the industry 
mean (π0j) varying randomly around a grand mean. In this level, the level–1 regression coefficient 
(π0j) is used as outcome variable related to each of the level–2 predictors. Thus:  
π0j = b00j + r0j,   (2) 
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where b00j is the grand mean, and r0j is the random industry effect (the deviation of industry j’s 
mean from the grand mean). Again, these effects are assumed to follow a normal distribution and have 
a zero mean and variance tp. 
The level–3 (country) model corresponds to the variability among countries, with the country 
mean (γ000) varying randomly around a grand mean:  
β00j = g000 + u00k,  (3) 
where g000 is the grand mean and u00k is the random country effect (the deviation of country’s 
k’s mean from the grand mean). Again, these effects are assumed to follow a normal distribution and 
have a zero mean and variance tβ. In this study, the objective of the three–level model is to partition 
the variability in performanceijk (ROA) into its components: among firms within industries, s2 (level–
1), among industries, tp (level–2) and among countries tβ (level–3). Thus the overall model becomes: 
Performanceijk = g000 + r0j + u00k + eij  (4) 
The calculation of the Variance Partition Coefficient (VPC) allows the estimation of the 
variance that can be attributed to firms within industries [s2 / (s2+ tp+ tβ)], among industries [tp / (s2+ 
tp+ tβ)] and among countries [tβ / (s2+ tp+ tβ)].  
 Furthermore, to test some of the study hypotheses, we need to estimate the interaction effects 
between Industry and Country. As this interaction is another way of nesting one factor within another, 
we can treat our model as a 3–level model with crossed terms. First, we create a set of indicator 
explanatory variables, one for each Country at level–3, with random intercepts uncorrelated and with 
variances constrained to be equal. Then we generate the interaction groups, by combining the industry 
with the country of each company in the sample, resulting in 760 different groups. Finally, we use an 
additional nesting level to estimate the variance component for the interaction term Country × 
Industry.  
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Preliminary findings 
According to data from the World Bank, the global GDP growth rate, which was around five percent 
during 2005–2007, declined to three percent in 2008 and turned negative in 2009 (Figure 1a). The 
above pattern is consistent across our sample of developed and emerging economies, although 
naturally the latter project higher overall GDP growth rates (Figure 1b). Furthermore, during the year 
2008 alone approximately $17.6 trillion in market capitalization was lost (–43 percent) in the 
examined developed capital markets and another $6.3 trillion (–58 percent) in the emerging ones 
(Figure 1c). Therefore, it becomes clear that the 2008 recession had a severe impact across the global 
economy, slowing down global GDP, and costing over $24 trillion in market capitalization across the 
biggest emerging and developed countries. 
—————————–Insert Figure 1 here—————————— 
The above patterns are similar when examining firm profitability. In Panel A of Table 1, we 
present mean Return on Assets (ROA percent) per year, for the entire sample and for each of the two 
subsamples of emerging and developed countries. The grand mean ROA for all years across all 
countries is 1.35 percent. Companies in emerging countries exhibit higher mean ROA than their 
developed counterparts (3.42 percent vs. 0.43 percent respectively). However, both subsamples 
experienced similar patterns of decline in the years following the 2008 recession. The average post–
recession Mean–ROA was lower by 1.28 and 2.39 for firms in emerging and developed countries 
accordingly. Individual country differences in mean ROA performance are also very interesting (see 
Panel B – Table 1). Across all developed countries, mean ROA presented significant declines. 
Meanwhile, the mean ROA in emerging countries dropped significantly in 7 out the 10 examined 
markets (in three cases the change was insignificant). The above preliminary results confirm that the 
impact of the 2008 recession was certainly comparable across countries at different stage of economic 
development.  
—————————– Insert Table 1 here—————————— 
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Empirical results 
Firm and industry effects in recessionary economic periods compared to expansion periods 
(Hypotheses 1 and 2) 
In Table 2 we present the results for the main and interaction effects from all HLM estimations. In 
Panel A, three different models were estimated, namely one main effects model for all years, one for 
the expansionary period (2005–07) and one for the recessionary period (2008–11). Revisiting the case 
of firm and industry effects on profitability, we clearly see the predominance of firm effects across all 
main effects models, as has been strongly supported by most past studies. Indeed, firm effects account 
for the majority of the ROA variance under all three models, with VPC coefficients ranging from 
87.31 percent to 90.38 percent. This is an important finding. When examining the differences between 
the two contrasting periods, we observe that firm effects in recessionary periods are higher than those 
in expansionary periods, offering strong support to the first hypothesis (H1). The difference in the 
VPC is 3.07 percent.  
With respect to the industry effects, our results also support Hypothesis 2 (H2). In particular, 
while the industry effects account for 9.47 percent of the total variance during the period of 
expansion, their explanatory power is reduced considerably to 6.13 percent during the recession. The 
difference in the VPC is 3.35 percent. Finally, the model χ2 is highly significant at 0.001 across all 
three models5. 
Country effects in emerging economies in recessionary economic periods compared to expansion 
periods (Hypothesis 3) 
In Panel B, we present the results from three further models of emerging economy firms only. In 
particular, we estimate one main effects model for all years, one for the expansionary period (2005–
07) and one for the recessionary period (2008–11), with the aim to examine the behaviour of country 
effects in emerging economies across the two periods. The empirical evidence verifies the expectation 																																								 																					5		 While a limitation of the 3-level random coefficient model is the lack of tests for the statistical significance 
for each variance partition coefficient (VPC), the fact that the model χ2 is significant offers an appropriate 
degree of assurance. However, for the purposes of the study, only differences over 1 percent across the two 
periods are considered large enough to give support to our hypotheses.	
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that country effects are typically stronger in emerging economies. Indeed, once we exclude developed 
markets in our analysis (Panel B vs. Panel A), the country effects rise from 3.45 percent to 4.42 
percent of the total variance in ROA. More importantly however, our analysis confirms Hypothesis 3 
(H3): country effects in emerging economies dropped from 6.38 percent during expansion to 2.75 
percent during the recession, showing a decline of 3.63 percent in explaining total ROA variance. 
Country–industry effects in recession compared to expansion periods (Hypothesis 4) 
In Panel C, we present the results from three further models of the entire sample. In particular, we 
estimated three extended ‘Country x Industry’ interaction effects models: one for all years, one for the 
expansionary period (2005–2007), and one for the recessionary period (2008–11). 
The inclusion of the country–industry interaction term yields some intriguing results. In 
particular, we can see that –as expected– the country–industry effects drop during recession. In fact, 
while in the expansionary periods country–industry effects account for 6.62 percent of the variance in 
ROA, in the recessionary periods they drop to 4.17 percent, fully supporting Hypothesis 4. The 
difference in the VPC is 2.45 percent and the model χ2 is highly significant at 0.001 across all three 
models. 
Interestingly, a closer look across the two Panels A and C provides some unexpected insights. 
We observe that the country – industry interaction effects overtake the main industry effects in all 
three models. In fact, when the interaction term is introduced in Panel C, the industry effects drop to 
2.63 percent (from 7.83 percent in Panel A) in the all–years model. The results are similar for 
expansionary and recessionary periods. Although the direction of the relationship in all the above 
cases remains the same, clearly supporting Hypothesis 2, the reduction of the main industry effects 
suggests that it is not the industry effects that singularly matter for firm performance, but rather the 
combined country–industry effect. 
—————————–Insert Table 2 here —————————— 
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Sensitivity analysis and robustness of the results 
The above findings suggest that the state of the global economy influences the role of firm, industry, 
and country effects on firm profitability. To test the hypotheses, we employed data for two distinct 
periods, namely the expansion (2005–07) and the recession (2008–11). We used a sample of ‘all 
countries’ to test Hypotheses 1, 2 and 4, and data from ‘emerging countries’ only to test Hypothesis 3. 
However, for these conclusions to be robust, we need to ascertain that the empirical results are not 
driven by the predominance of developed market firms in the sample (10,422 vs. 4,586 firms). After 
all, since the institutional environments are generally known to differ markedly between developed 
and emerging economies (Peng et al., 2008), one might expect the influence of a recession on firm, 
industry and country effects to differ across developed and emerging economies.  
To validate the above findings in a more stringent setting, we produce a set of further model 
estimations, where the initial sample is split into emerging versus developed, and all hypotheses are 
re–tested. Specifically, we estimate four new main–effects models: two for developed countries –
during expansion and recession– and another two for emerging economies. We present the results in 
Panel A of Table 3. We note that the original hypotheses are confirmed as proposed. With respect to 
Hypothesis 1, firm effects are always higher in the recession compared to expansion, among both the 
developed and the emerging countries. In addition, with respect to Hypothesis 2, industry effects are 
lower during the recession, across both developed and emerging countries. 
In panel B of Table 3, we present the results of four new country–industry interaction effects 
HLM models. The results for Hypotheses 1 and 2 are robust to the inclusion of the interaction term, 
although the decline is less pronounced in emerging countries. With regards to Hypothesis 4, country–
industry effects remain indeed lower during the recession, irrespective of the country stage of 
development. However, the decline is more pronounced among the developed countries, where 
country–industry effects drop by 2.05 percent, compared to 0.43 percent across emerging countries.  
As was the case in the main results (Table 2), the addition of the country–industry interaction term 
causes the explanatory power of the industry main effect to drop significantly, without however 
altering the hypothesised direction.    
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 Consequently, we suggest that the study results are robust when we break the sample into 
developed and emerging economy firms, with firm, industry and country–industry effects being 
similarly influenced by the global post–2008 recession.  
—————————–Insert Table 3 here—————————— 
Additional country–specific analysis 
While it is traditional to examine the behavior of firms by placing them into developed vs. emerging 
country categories, this may be seen as arbitrary in practice. Such a broad categorization may mask 
the significant variations within each category. Due to the unique characteristics of each country’s 
institutional environment, one could reasonably expect that the global recession may have had 
idiosyncratic influences on the firm – industry effects relationship across different countries. Hence, 
to validate the study findings under an even more stringent setting, we further estimated a 2– level 
model (Firm– Industry) for each of the 20 countries separately, and for each of the two periods 
(expansion and recession). This analysis resulted in 40 firm–industry combinations, as shown in 
Appendix 1 (Table A1–2).  
We conclude that the original findings, with regards to the study hypotheses, are fairly robust to 
this kind of scrutiny. Overall, firm effects are higher during recession in most countries whereas 
industry effects are reduced respectively. However, the largest shifts in favor of firm–level 
explanations are found in specific countries like Norway, Mexico, Turkey, Austria, and India. This 
finding confirms the value of disaggregated analysis, which validates finer differences among 
countries categorized as either developed or emerging economy. Exceptions to the rule, presenting a 
decrease in firm effects during recession, are: Indonesia (–15.43%), Korea (–0.29%), Japan (–0.66%) 
and Switzerland (–1.77%). However, the model χ2 for Indonesia and Switzerland is not significant, 
while the changes in Korea and Japan are rather negligible. In general, the study’s two key 
hypotheses, H1 and H2, are confirmed even at this most stringent country level of analysis, for 16 out 
of 20 countries in the sample.  
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DISCUSSION  
The current study is driven by a central theoretical theme in strategic management: “the extent to 
which a firm’s fate is self–determined” (Short et al., 2007: 161). By reconciling institutional theory 
with resource based view and industrial organization economics, we demonstrate that the context of 
the general economic environment is most critical in determining the role of firm, industry, and 
country effects on firm profitability. To this end, we examine firm, industry, and country effects for 
recessionary and expansionary periods, the periods immediately preceding and following the global 
financial crisis of 2008. The analysis reveals intriguing results.  
First, we confirm that, irrespective of the economic environment, firm profitability is largely 
influenced by firm–specific effects, providing support for earlier work (McGahan & Porter, 2002, 
Short et al., 2007). Yet, we find that firm specific effects are particularly amplified during 
recessionary periods. This result gives support to Oliver’s  (1997) contention that firm heterogeneity 
should become more pronounced during economic crises, where the ‘rules of the game’ are fluid and 
strategic factor markets are more likely to be imperfect (Barney, 1986). In other words, we confirm 
our initial expectations (Hypothesis 1) that under periods of economic distress, strategic choices and 
capabilities gain importance in shaping firm profitability. It is noteworthy that these results are 
confirmed in the context of both developed and emerging economies, and found to be fairly stable as 
evidenced by a number of robustness tests.  
Second, we find support for the importance of industry–specific effects on determining firm 
profitability. As suggested by industrial organization economics, the industry characteristics (i.e. 
structure, intensity of competition and market concentration) will affect firm’s strategic direction and 
ability to generate rents (Bain, 1951, Mann, 1966). Indeed, we reveal that the industry effects account 
for approximately 8 percent of the total of variance in firm ROA. Furthermore, we find that during the 
post–2008 recession, the impact of industry effects on firm profitability weakens (confirming 
Hypothesis 2). This supports our expectation that sudden shifts in formal and informal institutions will 
compel industry participants to employ firm–specific strategic responses, deviating from isomorphic 
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industry norms (Scott, 1987). Robustness tests confirm this pattern for both the emerging and 
developed economies contrast, and for individual countries. 
Third, in harmony with past studies (Makino et al., 2004; McGahan and Victer, 2010), we 
confirm that country level effects are more pronounced in emerging economies than in developed 
ones. This phenomenon has been attributed to the presence of internal market structures, developed to 
bypass the institutional inefficiencies (Peng et al., 2008; Chakrabarti, Vidal & Mitchell, 2011). More 
importantly, we examine the impact of the recession on the country effects on the emerging 
economies alone, and find them to decline in significance by more than 60 percent (from 6.38 to 2.75 
percent of total variance in firm ROA). This unique finding suggests that sudden economic shocks 
affect both the external and internal markets in emerging economies, thereby reducing overall country 
effects. Effectively, in periods of recession, emerging economies firms will have to rely on their own 
resources and capabilities and less on country–specific norms.  
Fourth, we find convincing evidence for the importance of the country–industry interaction 
effects on firm profitability. Consistent with the work on foreign MNEs affiliates (Hawawini et al., 
2004, McGahan & Victer, 2010, Tong et al., 2008), our findings suggest that the way each country 
utilizes its resources to develop unique industrial competencies is paramount for firm performance. In 
addition, the findings advance our knowledge on the behaviour of country–industry effects during 
recession. In particular, we reveal that country–industry interaction effects are reduced during 
recessions (from 6.62 to 4.17 percent), confirming Hypothesis 4. During recessions, the advantages 
associated with specific industries are moderated, reducing the overall impact of the country–industry 
effects on firm performance.  
Fifth, the “take–home message” for managers is that the firm’s own fate is, to a great extent, 
self–determined, a reality that is even more pronounced during periods of extreme economic hardship. 
In periods of generalised economic adversity, the role of the industry and the country are reduced and 
the firm’s own resources and capabilities become even more important for firm performance. Under 
such conditions, managers will need to make the best use of the limited resources available, in order 
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to over–perform the market and survive, or risk facing extreme departures from the country–industry 
trend and experience severe underperformance.  
 
Country–specific implications 
Large vs. small economies: effects during expansion and recession 
The size of the economy may contribute to the stability of firm – industry effects, leading to relatively 
smaller changes between the two periods. Indeed, in the individual country analysis (Table II–1 in 
Appendix), we find that changes in the respective magnitude of firm–industry effects are smaller in 
the case of large economies such as China, Japan, U.S., U.K. and Canada. In contrast, we find that 
most noticeable shifts are exhibited in the case of smaller economies, such as Norway, Sweden, 
Mexico and Turkey. Why would the size of an economy matter? One explanation could be that in a 
smaller economy, shifts in demand will result in relatively higher competition within the domestic 
market, compelling firms to react more urgently and in pronounced ways against adversity. In such 
cases, firm strategic choices may become even more important in explaining performance. 
Specific case of Brazil, India and China  
The behavior of the three BRIC countries deserves special examination (Russia was excluded from 
the analysis due to unreliable data). With respect to China, we find a remarkable stability in the 
respective roles of industry vs. firm–level variation between the expansion and recession. Although 
firm effects in China did become stronger as expected (H1 supported), and industry effects did 
become weaker accordingly (H2 supported), the overall firm–industry relationship did not change 
dramatically. One explanation is that a great majority of the Chinese GDP is still accounted by state–
owned enterprises that are run by bureaucrats who are more responsive to centralised political 
directives rather than global economic forces. Another explanation is that, through massive deliberate 
investment prior and immediately after the global recession, China did manage to insulate itself from 
adverse effects in the worldwide economy. Indeed, despite Chinese GDP growth rate experiencing 
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one of the highest declines across the emerging economies (from 12.72 to 9.65 percent between the 
two periods), Chinese growth remained remarkable. 
Similarly, Brazil also did not exhibit a major shift in the distribution of firm vs. industry level 
effects (although both H1 and H2 were confirmed). Firm level variance registered only a modest gain 
following the recession (1.44%). Explanations could be based on the relatively stable growth during 
the years of the Lula presidency, the robust growth in its primary industries (oil, agriculture, mining), 
and/or relatively large role of the state ownership in the country’s GDP. 
Of the three BRIC countries, only in India firm–effects marked a significant over 5 percent 
increase at the expense of the industry–level effects. This result may be due, in part, to the dynamic 
nature of the Indian economy following the economic reforms, which begun in earnest in the early 
1990s. Following these remarkable market liberalization efforts, Indian firms achieved much 
flexibility and freedom in responding to global economic trends. Respectable rates of economic 
growth followed, bringing about a rising middle class, equipped with substantial disposable income 
(Cavusgil and Cavusgil, 2012). Hence, domestic economic dynamics in India may have tempered 
adverse global economy trends, thus facilitating Indian firms, market performance.  
 
Implications for future research 
Potency of Firm Effects on Multiple Contexts: The finding that reveal substantial impact of firm 
effects on performance – consistently across both expansionary periods and times of great economic 
turbulence – implies prevalent and durable nature of firm strategy. We note that the lowest variance 
partition coefficient (VPC) for firm effects was 87 percent. Future research should explore the 
consistency of this effect in other contexts. One such context is the ownership type. Will the firm 
effect continue to be so dominant across: (a) publicly owned; (b) privately owned; and (c) state owned 
companies? One may speculate that managers of privately owned firms may have greater discretion 
with respect to strategic choices and, therefore, be in a better position to combat environmental 
turbulence. Another context for exploring the behaviour of firm effects would be organizational 
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culture, i.e. autocratic versus democratic leadership styles. Similarly, scholars can explore the 
relevance of such national cultural variables as tolerance for ambiguity. In summary, it would be 
worthwhile to examine the consistency of firm effects, in comparison to industry and country effects, 
across diverse organizational contexts in order to strengthen the generalizability of the results.  
Types of Resources Deployed: While the findings reported here offer unambiguous evidence 
that firm effects prevail during both expansionary and recessionary periods, we do not know exactly 
what types of strategic choices or managerial actions tend to promote superior performance. 
Expressed differently, this question refers to the versatility of firm resources. We learn that managers 
are able to deploy a variety of organizational capabilities and strategic assets when it comes to 
managing environmental turbulence. However, our knowledge of suitability of specific firm resources 
that are most appropriate under such circumstances is inadequate. One relevant dimension to consider 
is organizational slack. Slack resources are often thought to give impetus to enhance performance 
(Cheng & Kesner, 1997, Latham & Braun, 2008, Tan & Peng, 2003). Capabilities and assets that may 
lay dormant in the firm could be mobilized at times of necessity. If so, firm processes for discovering 
and deploying slack resources during adversity are of utmost concern. Scholars may also investigate 
the types of slack resources that are most productive in overcoming prolonged economic turbulence.  
Alternative Performance Measures: Finally, in this study, we employed ROA as the proxy for 
firm performance. Future research could, for example, utilize such alternative measures of firm 
performance as sales, profitability, growth, and Tobin’s Q. These efforts will surely lend further 
evidence for the findings reported in the present study based on both performance variables selected 
and data equivalence issues explored across types of countries (e.g., Hult et al. 2008a, 2008b). 
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TABLES & FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. GDP Growth and Domestic Market Capitalization in Emerging and Developed Markets 
 
 
 
Notes: The first figure illustrates the global GDP growth rate during the period 2005–2011 and the second the 
mean GDP growth rate for two country groups (developed – emerging) from our sample. The third figure 
portrays the combined market capitalization across the ten largest developed and emerging capital markets in our 
sample. The dashed line represents the annual ratio of the total market cap of the developed markets over that of 
the emerging ones. The countries and their respective stock markets in our sample are: Developed Countries 
(Markets): Australia (Australian SE), Canada (TMX Group), Germany (Deutsche Borse), Japan (Tokyo SE 
Group), Netherlands (NYSE Euronext (Europe)), Norway (Oslo Bors), Sweden (NASDAQ OMX Nordic 
Exchange), Switzerland (SIX Swiss Exchange), UK (London SE Group) and USA (NYSE Euronext (US) and 
NASDAQ OMX). Emerging Countries (Markets): Brazil (BM&F Bovespa), China (Shenzhen SE and Shanghai 
SE), India (BSE Ltd), Indonesia (Indonesia SE), South Korea (Korea Exchange), Mexico (Mexican Exchange), 
Philippines (Philippine SE), Poland (Warsaw SE), South Africa (Johannesburg SE) and Turkey (IMKB). Data 
Sources: World Federation of Exchanges and World Bank 
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Table 1. Key Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A: Number of Firm–Year Observations and Performance Statistics 
             
  
Full sample  Emerging Countries  Developed Countries 
Year  Count  
Mean 
ROA (%)  Count  
Mean 
ROA (%)  Count  
Mean 
ROA (%) 
2005  
 15,008   2.24   4,586   3.71   10,422   1.59 
2006  
 15,008   2.68   4,586   4.17   10,422   2.02 
2007  
 15,008   2.65   4,586   4.58   10,422   1.81 
2008  
 15,008   –0.34   4,586   2.25   10,422   –1.48 
2009  
 15,008   –0.91   4,586   2.65   10,422   –2.47 
2010  
 15,008   1.75   4,586   3.65   10,422   0.92 
2011  
 15,008   1.34   4,586   2.90   10,422   0.66 
Total   105,056   1.35 
  32,102   3.42   72,954   0.43 
 
Panel B: Performance per Country During Expansion (2005–2007) and Recession (2008–2011) 
Emerging Countries  Mean ROA (%)  
  
 Expansion Recession  Change T–Test 
Brazil  2.71  2.37   –0.34 (–0.44) 
China  3.46  2.85   –0.61
** (–3.07) 
Indonesia  2.34  2.93    0.58 ( 1.03) India  7.02  4.99   –2.03
*** (–5.82) 
Korea  3.25  1.47   –1.77
*** (–5.51) 
Mexico  5.36  3.14   –2.22
** (–2.53) 
Philippines  3.79  3.59   –0.21 (–0.28) Poland  5.31  1.34   –3.96
*** (–5.75) 
Turkey  3.99  1.83   –2.16
** (–3.03) 
South Africa   8.38  4.88   –3.50
*** (–4.58) 
Developed Countries  Mean ROA (%)     Expansion Recession  Change T–Test 
Australia  1.11  –1.79   
–2.90*** (–4.04) 
Canada  0.99  –1.18   –2.17
*** (–3.46) 
Switzerland  4.31  1.46   –2.85
*** (–3.74) 
Germany  3.27  0.59   –2.67
*** (–5.43) 
UK  2.47  –0.12   –2.58
*** (–6.38) 
Japan  2.68  0.73   –1.95
*** (–15.73) 
Netherlands  5.16  –0.26   –5.42
*** (–4.96) 
Norway  2.63  –1.46   –4.08
** (–3.28) 
Sweden  2.36  –0.60   –2.96
** (–2.76) 
USA  0.68  –1.76   –2.44
*** (–9.93) 
        Emerging Economies 
 
4.15  2.86   –1.28
*** (9.31) 
Developed Economies  1.81  –0.59   –2.39
*** (18.79) 
Notes: ***,**, * significant at 0.001, 0.01 and 0.05 respectively 
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Table 2. Variance Decomposition Results: Expansion vs. Recession Period  
Panel A: Main Effects Model – All Countries (H1 and H2) 
	  All Years  Expansion   Recession   Difference 
   VC
a VPCb  VC VPC  VC VPC  VPC 
Firm Effects  54.660 88.73%  61.870 87.31%  68.760 90.38%  3.07% 
	
 (0.322) 	  (0.364) 	  (0.404) 	  [H1] 
Industry Effects  4.822 7.83%  6.714 9.47%  4.663 6.13%  –3.35% 
	
 (0.251) 	  (0.328) 	  (0.268) 	  [H2] 
Country Effects  2.124 3.45%  2.279 3.22%  2.657 3.49%  0.28% 
   (0.396) 		  (0.435) 		  (0.493) 		   
LR test χ2 (2):     		 1,450,30***   		 1,414.30***   		 1,226.70***  			
Panel B: Main Effects Model – Emerging Economies (H3) 
	  All Years  Expansion   Recession   Difference 
   VC
a VPCb  VC VPC  VC VPC  VPC 
Firm Effects  30.030 84.36%  39.680 83.27%  37.570 87.86%  4.59% 
	
 (0.327) 	   (0.431) 	
  (0.408) 	   
Industry Effects  3.995 11.22%  4.933 10.35%  4.018 9.40%  –0.95% 
	
 (0.333) 	   (0.419) 	
  (0.359) 	   
Country Effects  1.572 4.42%  3.039 6.38%  1.174 2.75%  –3.63% 
   (0.406) 		   (0.753)  	
  (0.326)  	  [H3] 
LR test χ2 (2):     		 709.00***   	 389.70***   	 261.20***  
		
Panel C: Interaction Effects Model – All Countries (H4) 
	  All years  Expansion   Recession   Difference    VC VPC  VC VPC  VC VPC  VPC Firm Effects  54.620 88.36%  61.840 86.99%  68.720 90.12%  3.14% 
	
 (0.321) 	  (0.364) 	  (0.403) 	   
Industry Effects  1.628 2.63%  2.043 2.87%  1.734 2.27%  –0.60% 
	
 (0.231) 	  (0.283) 	  (0.253) 	   
Country Effects  2.203 3.56%  2.498 3.51%  2.613 3.43%  –0.09% 
  (0.400) 	  (0.460) 	  (0.475) 	   
Country x Industry   3.364 5.44%  4.709 6.62%  3.183 4.17%  –2.45% 
		  (0.205) 		  (0.268) 		  (0.218) 		  [H4] 
LR test χ2 (3):      		 1,500.50***  		 1,470.80***    		 1,272.30***    		
Notes: 
a VC = Variance Component / b VPC = Variance Partition Coefficient / Standard Errors in brackets () 
*** Prob> χ2 significant at 0.001 
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Table 3. Variance Decomposition Results: Robustness Tests  
Panel A: Main Effects Model  
Emerging Countries   Expansion  Recession  Difference  VCa VPCb  VC VPC  VPC 
Firm Effects  39.680 83.27%  37.570 87.86%  4.59% 
 
  (0.431)    (0.408)    Industry Effects  4.933 10.35%  4.018 9.40%  –0.96% 
 
  (0.419)    (0.359)    Country Effects  3.039 6.38%  1.174 2.75%  –3.63% 
    (0.753)     (0.326)    
 LR test χ2 (2):      389.70***    261.20***  
          
Developed Countries   Expansion  Recession  Difference  VC VPC  VC VPC   VPC 
Firm Effects  71.400 89.05%  82.160 93.10%  4.04% 
 
  (0.503)    (0.578)    Industry Effects  8.649 10.79%  5.930 6.72%  –4.07% 
 
  (0.520)    (0.425)    Country Effects  0.127 0.16%  0.162 0.18%  0.03% 
    (0.160)     (0.119)     LR test χ2 (2):     
 
827.10***  
 
530.50***  
 Panel B: Main and Interaction Effects Model  
Emerging Countries   Expansion  Recession  Difference  VC VPC  VC VPC  VPC 
Firm Effects  39.740 83.69%  37.580 87.94%  4.25% 
 
 (0.432)   (0.408)    Industry Effects  1.206 2.54%  1.045 2.45%  –0.09% 
 
 (0.262)   (0.249)    Country Effects  3.037 6.40%  1.141 2.67%  –3.73% 
 
 (0.743)   (0.311)    Country x Industry Effects  3.503 7.38%  2.970 6.95%  –0.43% 
   (0.380)    (0.330)    
 LR test χ2 (3):       401.40***    270.70***    
         
Developed Countries   Expansion  Recession  Difference  VC VPC  VC VPC  VPC 
Firm Effects  71.340 88.79%  82.050 92.79%  4.00% 
 
 (0.501)   (0.576)    Industry Effects  3.514 4.37%  2.704 3.06%  –1.32% 
 
 (0.467)   (0.390)    Country Effects  0.904 1.13%  0.435 0.49%  –0.63% 
 
 (0.331)   (0.179)    Country x Industry Effects  4.586 5.71%  3.235 3.66%  –2.05% 
   (0.357)    (0.299)    
 LR test χ2 (3):       882.80***    573.90***    
Notes: 
a VC = Variance Component / b VPC = Variance Partition Coefficient / Standard Errors in brackets () 
*** Prob> χ2 significant at 0.001 	
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APPENDIX 1 
Table A1–1. Data Description: Number of Firms Per Country and Industry 
                    
Panel A: Emerging Countries 
SIC 2 a :  10–14 15–17 20–39 40–49 50–51 52–59 60–67 70–89 Total 
         Brazil 3 14 108 52 5 10 42 17 251
China 56 81 1,013 166 63 80 150 89 1,698 
Indonesia 20 12 113 24 18 12 78 13 290 
India 9 43 378 45 5 2 64 72 618 
Korea 2 44 628 46 31 13 56 76 896 
Mexico 2 10 33 9 0 11 19 3 87 
Philippines 11 10 33 24 0 2 59 16 155 
Poland 2 23 86 15 13 3 25 24 191 
Turkey 0 2 130 11 3 4 36 10 196 
South Africa  14 11 51 15 12 21 50 30 204 
Subtotal 119 250 2,573 407 150 158 579 350 4,586 
Panel B: Developed Countries 
SIC 2 :  10–14 15–17 20–39 40–49 50–51 52–59 60–67 70–89 Total 
        Australia 69 15 126 45 21 23 138 128 565
Canada 121 13 164 60 21 25 125 77 606 
Switzerland 0 0 93 12 4 3 62 19 193 
Germany 0 9 217 42 14 10 105 115 512 
UK 45 29 262 62 25 55 357 232 1,067 
Japan 5 178 1,487 178 255 310 250 485 3,148 
Netherlands 3 7 40 0 6 2 20 27 105 
Norway 26 2 27 18 0 0 26 11 110 
Sweden 4 4 107 9 4 4 30 56 218 
USA 170 40 1,438 312 106 211 994 627 3,898 
Subtotal 443 297 3,961 738 456 643 2,107 1,777 10,422 
Grand Total 562 547 6,534 1,145 606 801 2,686 2,127 15,008 
Notes:           10–14 Mining         15–17 Construction 
       20–39 Manufacturing 
       40–49 Transportation & Public Utilities 
     50–51 Wholesale Trade 
52–59 Retail Trade 
       60–67 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 
     70–89 Services          
a Standard Industrial Classification (SIC 2) codes are grouped in this table for brevity purposes 
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Table A1–2. Variance Decomposition Results per Country 
	 Panel A: Firm Effects (H1)  
	
Panel B: Industry Effects  (H2)  
	
VCa VPCb 		
	
VCa VPCb 		
		 Expansion Recession Expansion Recession Diff. 
	
Expansion Recession Expansion Recession Diff. 
BRA 
(N=260) 
64.67 58.96 81.76% 83.35% 1.59% 
	
14.43 11.78 18.24% 16.65% –1.59% 
(3.17) (2.84) [15.3***] [18.1***]    (3.54) (2.78) [15.3
***] [18.1***]   
CHN 
(N=1704) 
33.41 30.86 94.65% 96.10% 1.44% 
	
1.89 1.25 5.35% 3.90% –1.44% 
(0.58) (0.54) [27.2] [20.0]    (0.41) (0.27) [27.2] [20.0]   
IDN 
(N=304) 
43.07 39.04 94.60% 79.17% –15.43% 
	
2.46 10.27 5.40% 20.83% 15.43% 
(1.88) (1.73) [2.6] [19.7***]    (1.05) (2.12) [2.6] [19.7
***]   
IND 
(N=631) 
30.87 33.11 81.22% 87.04% 5.83% 
	
7.14 4.93 18.78% 12.96% –5.83% 
(0.91) (0.96) [70.0***] [53.8***]    (1.33) (0.93) [70.0
***] [53.8***]   
KOR 
(N=905) 
46.03 41.55 92.73% 92.45% –0.29% 
	
3.61 3.40 7.27% 7.55% 0.29% 
(1.12) (1.01) [18.7***] [25.7***]    (0.91) (0.85) [18.7
***] [25.7***]   
MEX 
(N=103) 
28.72 31.93 85.50% 98.32% 12.82% 
	
4.87 0.55 14.50% 1.68% –12.82% 
(2.3) (2.41) [3.1*] [0.1]    (1.86) (1.0) [3.1] [0.1]   
PHL 
(N=165) 
35.79 33.96 85.93% 88.11% 2.17% 
	
5.86 4.58 14.07% 11.89% –2.17% 
(2.16) (2.06) [5.3*] [3.8*]    (1.89) (1.71) [5.3
*] [3.8*]   
POL 
(N=202) 
45.03 49.91 98.90% 100.00% 1.10% 
	
0.50 0.00 1.10% 0.00% –1.10% 
(2.42) (2.48) [0.1] [0.0]    (0.99) (0.00) [0.1] [0.0]   
TUR 
(N=206) 
43.10 43.39 84.19% 95.53% 11.34% 
	
8.10 2.03 15.81% 4.47% –11.34% 
(2.28) (2.23) [18.6***] [2.5]    (1.92) (0.90) [18.6] [2.5]   
ZAF 
(N=216) 
63.23 57.63 99.89% 100.00% 0.11% 
	
0.07 0.00 0.11% 0.00% –0.11% 
(3.23) (2.77) [0.0] [0.0]    (1.04) (0.00) [0.0] [0.0]   
AUS 
(N=576) 
127.40 140.70 89.77% 95.70% 5.93% 
	
14.52 6.33 10.23% 4.30% –5.93% 
(3.88) (4.27) [28.7***] [6.7**]    (2.67) (1.86) [28.7
**] [6.7**]   
CAN 
(N=623) 
99.29 107.40 84.21% 87.15% 2.94% 
	
18.62 15.84 15.79% 12.85% –2.94% 
(2.91) (3.15) [53.1***] [32.9***]    (2.96) (2.76) [53.1
***] [32.9***]   
CHE 
(N=208) 
51.79 58.29 97.63% 95.86% –1.77% 
	
1.26 2.52 2.37% 4.14% 1.77% 
(2.65) (3.05) [0.7] [1.1]    (0.94) (1.50) [0.7] [1.1]   
DEU 
(N=528) 
54.09 60.77 92.50% 95.94% 3.44% 
	
4.39 2.57 7.50% 4.06% –3.44% 
(1.72) (1.93) [13.1***] [5.9**]    (1.04) (0.82) [13.1
**] [5.9**]   
GBR 
(N=1077) 
84.20 83.19 94.28% 97.12% 2.84% 
	
5.11 2.47 5.72% 2.88% –2.84% 
(1.85) (1.82) [21.2***] [15.0***]    (1.02) (0.66) [21.2
***] [15.0***]   
JPN 
(N=3161) 
19.00 26.74 93.90% 93.23% –0.66% 
	
1.24 1.94 6.10% 6.77% 0.66% 
(0.24) (0.34) [125.3***] [96.1***]    (0.17) (0.28) [125.3
***] [96.1***]   
NLD 
(N=120) 
44.19 62.49 93.15% 93.66% 0.51% 
	
3.25 4.23 6.85% 6.34% –0.51% 
(3.17) (4.31) [1.0] [1.9]    (1.90) (2.06) [1.0] [1.9]   
NOR 
(N=623) 
66.73 83.74 83.53% 99.10% 15.58% 
	
13.16 0.76 16.47% 0.90% –15.58% 
(4.7) (6.27) [4.5*] [0.0]    (4.58) (3.66) [4.5] [0.0]   
SWE 
(N=234) 
110.60 115.80 86.53% 95.32% 8.80% 
	
17.22 5.68 13.47% 4.68% –8.80% 
(5.48) (5.60) [11.9***] [2.7]    (4.47) (2.48) [11.9] [2.7]   
USA 
(N=3929) 
99.32 116.00 91.63% 93.96% 2.32% 
	
9.07 7.46 8.37% 6.04% –2.32% 
(1.13) (1.32) [339.1***] [203.6***]    (1.03) (0.96) [339.1
***] [203.6***]   
Notes: a VC = Variance Component / b VPC = Variance Partition Coefficient / Standard Errors in brackets (...) / LR 
test χ2 in square brackets […] / ***,**,*:  Prob> χ2 significant at 0.001, 0.01, 0.1 respectively 
 The emerging countries sample includes Brazil (BRA), China (CHN), Indonesia (IDN), India (IND), South Korea 
(KOR), Mexico (MEX), Philippines (PHL), Poland (POL), Turkey (TUR) and South Africa (ZAF).  
The developed countries sample includes Australia (AUS), Canada (CAN), Switzerland (CHE), Germany (DEU), 
United Kingdom (GBR), Japan (JPN), Netherlands (NDL), Norway (NOR) Sweden (SWE) and United States (USA) 
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APPENDIX 2 
We present here a series of post hoc tests to establish the robustness of the study findings under 
alternative criteria. We first examine firm, industry and country effects for each year separately, 
without explicitly defining “expansion” or “recession”. Such a finer time–granularity allows us to 
examine the surrounding economic conditions as a continuum, rather than as a binary variable. 
Secondly, we focus on a single country (USA), but for a much longer time period (1975–2014), and 
examine how firm and industry Effects behave against key economic indicators. This latter approach 
has the additional advantage of providing measures of statistical significance.  
Step 1: Examination of Firm–Industry–Country Effects per year 
To proxy for the state of the global economic environment we choose the Consumer Confidence 
Index (CCI) for the OECD countries, one of the leading indicators of global economic activity 
(OECD, 2015). The advantage of the CCI, against global capital market–based indices, such as the 
‘FTSE	All–World’ or the ‘MSCI ACWI Index’, is that the CCI can be benchmarked against the 
absolute value of 100, which proxies for “normal” economic conditions. Values below 100, suggest 
reduced consumer confidence and economic contraction, while values above 100 indicate a positive 
sentiment in the global economy and growth prospects. In the Table below, we repeat the main 
analysis for all the companies in our sample by year. Then, we proceed by contrasting the results with 
the mean CCI during each year.  
Table A2–1. Post hoc Analysis: Variance Decomposition Results 
Panel A: Mean Annual Consumer Confidence Index (OECD) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
CCI (OECD) 100.46 100.64 100.60 98.19 98.12 99.31 98.86 
Panel B:  Variance Components per year 
VCa 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Firm Effects 90.530 82.100 82.760 148.300 136.400 74.850 85.710 
 
(0.510) (0.463) (0.466) (0.834) (0.764) (0.421) (0.482) 
Industry Effects 8.112 7.681 6.706 9.615 6.893 4.482 4.819 
 
(0.402) (0.380) (0.344) (0.533) (0.400) (0.261) (0.291) 
Country Effects 3.261 2.973 3.282 5.832 4.638 2.251 2.020 
  (0.594) (0.547) (0.585) (1.026) (0.808) (0.421) (0.387) 
LR test χ2 (2):   1,116.6*** 1,147.70*** 1,156.30*** 1,273.40*** 1,156.60*** 882.70*** 645.10*** 
Panel B: Variance Partition Coefficients per year 
VPCb 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Firm Effects 88.84% 88.51% 89.23% 90.57% 92.21% 91.75% 92.61% 
Industry Effects 7.96% 8.28% 7.23% 5.87% 4.66% 5.49% 5.21% 
Country Effects 3.20% 3.21% 3.54% 3.56% 3.14% 2.76% 2.18% 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The above results support that as the mean CCI declines from 2008 onwards, firm effects increase, 
presenting a consistently negative relationship with the economic sentiment. Naturally, industry 
effects follow the opposite direction and are positively related with CCI. 
Step 2: Examination of Firm–Industry Effects per year 
From Compustat, we retrieve annual accounting and industry (SIC2) information for all publicly 
listed companies in the US from 1975 to 2014. We calculate annual ROA for each firm and then 
estimate a 2–level model (Firm – Industry) for each of the 40 years in the period.  
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The results provide a “time series” of firm and industry effects (VC and VPC), to be contrasted 
against key economic indicators. On average, during the period 1975–2014, firm effects ranged from 
92.80% to 97.60% with a mean of 95.78%. Accordingly, industry effects ranged between 2.40% and 
7.20%, with a mean of 4.22%.  
Next we test whether the level of firm effects, and by extension that of industry effects, is associated 
with the wider economic conditions. Instead of the binary approach (expansion– recession) in the 
main results, we examine continuous economic indicators, such as the CCI (as above) and Real GDP 
growth. Summary statistics are shown in Table A2–2 below and the two indicators are also plotted: 
Table A2–2.  Key Economic Indicators  (USA: 
1975 – 2014)  
 
 
 
 
Mean SE Min. Median Max. 
CCI  100.15 0.14 98.12 100.44 101.83 
GDP (%) 2.72 0.33 –2.80 2.99 7.26 
      
We initially split the sample into years with CCI≥100 and CCI<100 and similarly into years with 
above and below median GDP Growth. We then perform univariate parametric T–tests and non–
parametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum tests for the difference in means (medians) in Table A2–3 below.  
Table A2–3. Tests For Differences in Firm Effects  
Panel A: Parametric T– Test 
  CCI <100 CCI≥100 Difference    
Count 15 26 
  Mean Firm Effects 96.24% 95.52% 0.72%** 
    (2.008)  
  Low GDP High GDP Difference    
Count 20 20 
  Mean Firm Effects 96.33% 95.39% 0.94%*** 
       (3.041)   
Panel B: Non–Parametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test 
  CCI <100 CCI≥100 z–score   
Count 15 26 
  Rank Sum 391 470 2.060** 
   Low GDP High GDP z–score   
Count 20 20 
  Rank Sum 520.5 299.5 2.993*** 
 * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Finally, in the following Figure A2–1 we plot the estimated Variance Partition Coefficients (VPC) for 
the firm and industry effects from the 40 2–level models during the period 1975 –2014, against the 
mean annual CCI. The OLS regression coefficient is –0.0054 (firm) and 0.0054 (industry) and 
significant, while the estimation has an R2 of 27.56%. This is further evidence that our original 
findings are robust to the use of a continuous variable for the economic conditions. Therefore, our 
hypotheses that “Firm (Industry) effects will be stronger (weaker) in recessionary periods compared to 
expansion ones”, in general holds for a long period (1975–2014) for the US and when using 
continuous variables to proxy for economic conditions.   
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Figure A2–1. VPC for Firm and Industry Effects against CCI	
  
 
We finally run another set of OLS regressions, this time controlling for sample size and year effects, 
while using Real GDP Growth and CCI as alternative proxies for the state of the economy. The results 
in Table A2–4 are robust across both models; the effect of the economy on firm effects is negative 
and significant at 1% and 5% respectively. 
Table A2–4. Post Hoc Analysis: OLS Regressions of Economic Variables against Firm Effects 
DV = Firm Effects Real GDP Model Consumer Confidence Model 
Intercept 0.770 1.363* 
 
(1.363) (1.822) 
Real GDP Growth –0.002*** – 
 
(–2.801) 
 Consumer Confidence – –0.005** 
  
(–2.282) 
Sample Size 0.000 0.000 
 
(1.312) (1.686) 
Year Effects P P 
    
F 13.550 10.909 
R2 0.366 0.350 
Adj. R2 0.313 0.296 
N 40 40 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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